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Where  there are people, there  is water--and conflict over water.  In
the upper Midwest, conflicts between use sectors,  such as agriculture,
industry, urban water supply and sanitation, fishery, navigation,
environmental preservation and recreation, are becoming increasingly acute
because of dry conditions and growing concern for environmental quality.1
The severity of these conflicts  is aggravated by lags  in the development
of institutions governing water use. 2
Many, perhaps most, of these conflicts will be resolved politically,
guided by economic values and economic and social  institutions.  This
paper briefly reviews  some of the conflicts over water use in Minnesota
and considers different institutional arrangements and policy tools which
*This  paper is based on an article by James E. Nickum and K. William
Easter, "Institutional Arrangements for Managing Water conflicts  in Lake
Basins"  to be published in Natural Resources Forum, August 1990, 40 p.,
and was presented at a conference  on "Minnesota Water 1990"  sponsored by
Minnesota's Water Resources Research Center, April 9-10,  1990.
**Professor of Agricultural and Applied Economics, University of
Minnesota.  I want to thank John Waelti for this thoughtful comments on an
earlier draft.
1 Within use  sectors, of course,  there are  conflicts, such as  those
between groups which share a scarce supply in sequence, or which overuse
an open access resource at the same time  (e.g. lake fishery),  or which
have differential access to  key inputs.  We deal with these conflicts
later in this paper.
2 For examples  from the western United States,  see Vaux (1986),  Young
(1986),  and Thompson (1987).
1could be of use in conflict management, including market and government
approaches as well as action by water users.
Conflicts over water result from both the quantity of water used and
its  quality.  These days,  there are growing conflicts in Minnesota over
water use in urban areas  as  well as water quality in agricultural based
communities.
WATER QUALITY CONFLICTS
Concerns about water  quality have been growing since the  1960s.  At
first, attention centered on surface water pollution from point sources,
but new information now indicates that ground water and sediment pollution
from non-point sources  are, at  least, equally serious problems.
Water pollution of rivers and streams has the important
characteristic of allowing polluters to  avoid the effects of their
pollution.  The effluent is dumped into the river and carried downstream
where others must bear the damages.  In contrast, it  is more difficult for
ground water or lake polluters to avoid damaging their own operations, as
Chicago found out a century ago:
From its  inception, Chicago drew its water from Lake
Michigan and dumped its wastes into  the Chicago River running
through the heart of Chicago and, prior to 1900, into the  lake.
The problem was obvious:  Chicago was polluting its  own water
supply.  The problem intensified as the city grew, and in 1885 a
typhoid and cholera epidemic claimed 12 percent of the city's
population (Easter and Waelti, 1980, p. 128).
Chicago was able  to  "solve"  its waste disposal problem by digging a
costly canal, completed in 1900, to  reverse the flow of the Chicago River
so that it emptied into a branch of the Illinois River, itself a tributary
of  the Mississippi.  Until the Chicago Sanitary District added treatment
2plants in 1922, the diversion  "created a problem of catastrophic
proportions for the river and its backwater lakes above Peorie",  a stretch
of some  250 km. (Stout, 1985, pp.  172-173).  Not all lake users are as
favorably situated as Chicago  to  find acceptable alternatives for
disposal.  The Mississippi basin is only a few miles from the city, and
the divide between them is  less than three meters high.
The more contemporary story of Waukegan, Illinois, just north of
Chicago, has a less  happy ending, at least so far.  Polychlorinated
biphenyl  (PCB) accumulations  in the city's artificial harbor on Lake
Michigan have led to  a ban on fishing and dredging.  The subsequent
buildup of silt effectively blocked the city's harbor (Ashworth, 1986,  pp.
176-179).
Sources and Cost of Pollution
Industries and municipalities are major point source contributors of
wastes.  The major source of nonpoint water pollution is  soil erosion.
Others  include manure, pesticides, and chemical  fertilizers from
agricultural lands.
Many times, pollution problems  are magnified by the variability of
water  supply over time.  Dry periods  can concentrate the pollutants while
heavy rainfall events can accelerate  soil erosion.  Irrigation investments
which are made to  deal with problems of drought may in some cases add to
pollution problems.  For example,  irrigation may cause  the leaching of
nutrients and herbicides  into the ground water, particularly in areas such
as the  sand plains of Minnesota.
3Benefits from controlling or cleaning up water pollution are measured
in terms of damages prevented.  These damages affect a wide range  of
users, including municipal, agricultural, recreational, and industrial
water users.  The damages  to municipalities include the  increased cost  of
water treatment, the cost  of developing new sources of water, greater
health treatment costs  and lower productivity of the labor force  (days
sick increase).  Industrial uses  also feel the impact of reduced water
quality through higher  costs.
Agricultural damages  come from salt accumulation that reduces crop
yields.  Toxic chemicals have also damaged both livestock and crops  or
their products, particularly milk.  Farmers and rural communities that are
dependent on ground water face the  same costs  as municipalities.
A wide range of water-based recreational activities, such as
fishing, swimming, and boating, are all  affected by water quality.  This
is particularly  important for Minnesota, with its 10,000 lakes and a large
tourism industry.  Increased pollution of Minnesota's recreational water
could be disastrous  to its economy.
This  distribution of pollution costs has  led to  a number of
conflicts  in Minnesota.  First was the conflict between industrial and
municipal polluters and recreational water users.  In response to  this
conflict, many billions of dollars have been spent on programs to  install
and improve municipal  treatment facilities.  Second is  the growing
conflict between farmers and recreational water users.  This conflict not
only influenced the U.S. farm bill, but has spawned programs  in Minnesota
such as RIM.  Third is  the conflict between farmers and users or potential
users of ground water.  As measurement of ground water quality has
4improved, it has become evident  that agriculture is polluting ground water
with herbicides and nitrates.  Finally, there  is a growing potential  for
conflict among states over pollution control regulations.  Will states
with strong environmental regulations  lose their competitive edge to
states with few regulations?
WATER QUANTITY CONFLICTS
Conflicts over water quantity occur mainly (1) when the water level
declines or increases significantly due to natural conditions or upstream
withdrawals;  (2) when significant withdrawals, often involving interbasin
transfers or pumping of groundwater, are made;  and  (3) when the discharge,
and therefore  the level, of a lake can be regulated in accordance with
preset operating rules.  When water with desirable properties becomes
scarce, due  to either quality or quantity factors, the high degree of
interdependency among water users intensifies  social conflict and cause
market failure.  Thus water resource development has long been an arena
for collective action or  government intervention.
Conflicts arise  in Minnesota, particularly in dry periods when water
withdrawals are  large and supplies are  low.  Good examples of such
conflicts  include the following.  First was  the  1988 conflict between the
Twin Cities and those  living around two northern lakes over the release of
lake water to increase  the flow in the Mississippi River.  Only a timely
rain dampened this conflict.  Second was the conflict between users of
Lake Minnetonka and those using ground water, over pumping ground water to
raise the lake  level.  Third was the 1988 conflict among Great Lakes
states over the release of Lake Michigan water into the Chicago river to
5increase stream flows downstream.  Finally, there is  the conflict between
irrigators using ground water and other well owners.  Minnesota's permit
system for wells has helped reduce  these latter conflicts  (Lotterman and
Waelti, 1983).  Thus, conflicts arise between rural and urban Minnesota
water users, between recreational and agricultural water users, between
north central and southern Minnesota water users, and between Great Lakes
states.  These conflicts will certainly reoccur during dry periods, unless
institutional arrangements are developed to help resolve them.
CONFLICT RESOLUTION
One response to  the high interdependency among water users and the
resulting conflicts is  to  develop institutional arrangements  to  govern
individual behavior.  Since another person is  influencing the production
or utility you receive from water, and this  influence is unintended, you
want to be able  to control this  influence.  Thus  there are strong
incentives  to  develop institutions that alter  the response of others or
define rights  and duties  in the  form of rules  that provide information
concerning how others will use  the water.  In the absence of institutional
arrangements, these conflicts are resolved in the courts which involves
very high transactions costs and has resulted, at best, in ad hoc
decisions.
These institutional arrangements  can establish rights to water use
subject to constraints, such as that one must put the water  to beneficial
use or that stream flows must be maintained at or above a certain level.
Many times, private rights specify some priority  in use, either in terms
of type of use  (agricultural, industrial or municipal) or  time of use
6(first in time,  first in right).  The problem is that most of these
systems of private rights fail to account adequately for  interdependencies
among users, particularly in terms of return flows and pollution.  They
do  little to stem pollution or large reductions  in water flows downstream.
Transactions Costs
Why are  institutions not developed to prevent or reduce conflicts
over water?  One answer  is  that institutional development is not free.
New institutions must be developed, specified, negotiated, enforced and
widely accepted by users.  In addition, information must be obtained
concerning the specific nature of problems the new institution  is  to
address,  such as  location, nature and magnitude of point and non-point
sources of pollution and their effect on water and sediments.  These costs
associated with institutional development are what is  generally called
transaction costs  (Williamson, 1985).  In many cases, these costs  can be
high.  "In a modern economy, the transactions industry is  quite massive.
It includes....agents of all kinds, attorneys, the police and the judicial
system, and the large and growing private sector enforcement systems"
(Randall, 1987, p. 158).  If the costs of change are higher than the
benefits derived from the institutional arrangements, then the new
institution will not be developed or the old institution will not be
changed.  However, as  water becomes increasingly scarce and therefore more
valuable, it will become more worthwhile to develop new institutional
arrangements.
7INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND POLICY TOOLS
FOR RESOLVING CONFLICT
Institutional arrangements for resolving conflicts  in water use can
be grouped under three general headings.  One  is  the increasingly popular
approach of establishing markets.  The second is the most widely used
approach which relies on government or quasi-government agencies  to
directly manage water use and allocation.  The third and final category
which can complement the other two,  involves collective action by water
users.  This  can be by means  of either formal or  informal groups  of water
users or concerned citizens.
Market Based Solutions
The role of the market as  a dispute resolution device has  long been
recognized by economists;  For example, Grossman (1974, p. 64) notes:
The market is....a social mechanism for the relocation of
conflicts at a relatively 'low' level....
It localizes ordinary economic business conflicts,  settles
them in the market place, and keeps them from migrating up to
the higher levels of the political structure, as would be
inevitable in a hierarchically organized economy....
The market mechanism's very impersonality, often and at
times justly criticized, has  its  positive side.  The market
respects economic worth and purchasing power whatever direction
it may come, and thereby tends  to provide economic opportunities
where  they might otherwise be barred by social or political
prejudice.
Young  (1985) describes some of the characteristics of water which
make  it difficult to develop institutional arrangements for market
exchange of water or water rights.  One of the key characteristics which
we have already discussed above is  the pervasive interdependency among
users.  Other important attributes include high resource mobility,
economies of scale in large water projects, variability  in supply and
8demand, and conflicting social values concerning water.  An additional
problem is  the high cost of making transactions, particularly when there
are a large number of water users involved.
Water Markets
In cases where  interdependence among water users is  limited, an
efficient market system can improve water allocation and utilization.
However,  to establish such a market requires several key institutional
arrangements.  First, water rights and responsibilities for the use and
transfer of water must be established.  Until this  is  done, markets will
be greatly constrained.  A second step  is  to improve the information
system concerning water supplies and demand.  This  is particularly
important if certain uses are dependent on the  level of stream flows or
low priority water rights do not get water during droughts.  Finally, the
water delivery system should be operated so that users can buy and sell
water  throughout the system.  In other words, the rules  for water delivery
must be flexible enough so that trades or sales do not require extensive
bargaining among many users which involve high transactions costs  (Easter,
1986).  For small or highly segmented systems, too limited a set of
trading opportunities may exist.  In such cases, market power, when
allowed to operate, may become too highly concentrated.  When this  occurs,
alternative sources of supply should be developed.
Tradeable Permits
A market medium that is being used more widely, particularly in the
case of air pollution, is  the tradeable permit.  A given level of
9permissible effluent discharge  is determined by a pollution control
agency.  This fixed discharge is  then allocated among firms based either
on willingness to  pay or on past discharge  levels.  The  firms can then buy
and sell  the permits, depending on their need and the permit price.  This,
of course,  encourages the development and adoption of technology that
reduces pollution so  that a firm does not have to buy a permit or
additional permits.  Such permits  tend to work only for easily monitored
point sources of pollution.
Issuing permits is  one way to establish comparable water rights.
People  sometimes oppose permit systems because they do not want to
establish rights  to pollute.  Yet with a permit system it becomes much
easier to  control and reallocate  the pollution so that damages can be
reduced.  Control could be maintained by issuing pollution permits for a
limited period of time, although this would limit their efficiency.
Effluent rights trading  is not theoretically the best method of
achieving a socially optimum combination of output and hazard.  That would
require "exposure trading", where the degree of harm caused by effluents
is  taken into account  (Rousmasset and Smith, 1990).  The information
requirements of exposure trading are likely to be much higher than for
effluent rights, however.
Water permits are also used to help manage irrigation well
development in Minnesota.  The current permit system has helped resolve a
number of conflicts over well interference, but the permits  are not
tradeable  (Lotterman and Waelti, 1983).  In areas with declining ground
water levels due to pumping, tradeable permits would be one way to
encourage water conservation and limit the amount of water withdrawn.  All
10that would be needed is  a measure of how much water  it  is  safe to withdraw
annually and a procedure to allocate this  amount amongst permit holders.
Once the allocation is made, then those needing additional water could
buy permits from the owners.  As  the demand for water increases, so would
the price of the permits, which would encourage additional conservation.
Bargaining to Reduce Water Pollution
Coase  (1960) and others have shown that bargaining can bring about a
socially optimum level of pollution when transactions costs are zero.
Within a lake, this may be quite appropriate if there are only a few
polluters on the lake and a few users being damaged.  When there are many
actors  involved, bargaining is limited by excessive  transactions costs.
One key decision that must be made is who has what rights.  Do  the
polluting firms and farms have the right to discharge  their effluents or
do water users have the right to clean water?  Whoever has the rights will
determine who pays for  the disposal  system.  In U.S. cities, we  solved the
problem by making the  taxpayers  (via the state and federal governments)
pay most of the cost of building the waste disposal systems:  ninety
percent in many cases.
For bargaining to  take place among water users, they need to have a
common interest in so doing.  Institutions need to be developed that allow
the different  interests to form separate bargaining units.  This can be
supported through laws,  for example, a law that says upstream firms cannot
exceed certain levels  of discharge or that they cannot change stream flows
or sediment loads without a penalty.  This would provide upstream users,
11who are  damaging the water source, with an incentive to bargain over
pollution levels.
For bargaining to  result in a relatively efficient and equitable
solution, all affected parties must be accounted for and information
concerning the  levels of pollution and their effect must be readily
available.  Equally important is  technical information.  Some  impartial
group or agency must collect information over time concerning levels of
pollution and the extent of damage  it causes.  We also need to  know how
changes  in practices affect pollution levels so  that they can be related
back to damages.  This is  no small task, either technically or
organizationally.  So  far,  the biggest gap in our knowledge appears  to be
in determining the damage costs.  This is  particularly true of  the longer
term cumulative impacts of pollution, which are often of concern in lakes.
Government Based Solutions
Even where markets are allowed to operate  fully, government
involvement will be necessary to resolve major disputes  and to  set the
rules  for markets themselves.  For example, where rights  to water use are
not clearly specified, a major responsibility of government would be to
delineate those rights  (and the duties such as  payment of taxes and fees
which are attached to them) and to make an initial assignment of rights to
individuals, groups or government agencies.
Supplv Oriented Solutions
A  traditional government approach to conflicts over water use  is  to
build another project, or to build one designed to deliver  an amount of
12water  sufficient to  meet the "needs" of all relevant users.  The
construction of multi-stage municipal water treatment facilities mentioned
earlier is  an example.  Projects  developed to increase stream discharges
during low flow periods  is another illustration.
This supply-oriented approach sometimes takes advantage of economies
of scale, reduces  the level of conflict among users, and is relatively
easy for a government agency to implement.  It is  also politically popular
for a state, particularly if the federal government pays most of the
costs.  Yet  it  is  expensive, with the costs usually borne  in large part by
nonbeneficiaries  (tax payers),  and is prone to nonmarket failure  (e.g.
inadequate provision for maintenance).
A superior strategy is  to actually reduce  the input of effluents into
the water body.  This  is  the only really effective approach for dealing
with nonpoint pollution problems, particularly in the case of ground
water.  For example, methods of cropping, timber harvesting, road building
and grazing must  all be adjusted to  reduce soil erosion and chemical
contamination.  This  can be achieved by using a wide range of possible
institutional arrangements and implementation tools,  including subsidies,
taxes,  land use regulations, land retirement, regulation of farming
practices, zoning and outright bans.
In a number of cases,  this means a reduction of economic activity
upstream.  Those affected may be faced with difficult choices concerning
changes  in their production enterprises.  With appropriate research and
extension, new crops or  industries could be introduced that are less
polluting.  Nonetheless, upstream-downstream conflicts are often difficult
13to solve, especially in the absence of effective basin-wide planning and
cost-sharing by all beneficiaries.
Incentives  and Special Interest
A growing area of concern is  the  impact of special interest groups on
government activity.  When high economic rents are at  stake, individuals,
groups of  individuals and firms have a strong incentive to influence
government action.3 This rent-seeking behavior can result in a misuse of
resources and involve political manipulation  (Gould and Amaro-Reyes,
1983).  The rents  tend to be captured by those with political power and
relatively high incomes.  Once the rents have been captured, the owners
have the funds and incentives  to make defensive expenditures  to protect
their rights.  In addition, those conferring the rights are  in a position
to  increase their share of the rents.  Over time, the mechanisms by which
successful rent-seekers obtain their gains become entrenched and are
extremely well defended  (Repetto, 1986).
Nonmarket Failure
Thus,  even though problems of market failure have often provided a
justification for establishing nonmarket means for regulating and
allocating water use--in particular, to  involve government agencies,
conflicts  and inefficiency, arise  as well from defects in the use of
nonmarket institutions and organizations.  Virtually all of the sources of
market failure are also present in many nonmarket situations:  (1) lack of
3.  "Rent is  ...  defined to be that part of a person's or firm's
income which is  above the minimum amount necessary to keep that person or
firm in  its given occupation."  (Henderson  and Quandt, 1980, pp.  151-152.)
14specification and transferability  of rights;  (2) conflicts over return
flows, especially between administrative units;  (3) rent seeking behavior;
and (4) high transaction costs.
Based on part on Wolf's 1979 theory of nonmarket failure, there are a
number of areas where agency management can be  improved.  These include
adjustments in the  incentive structure for managers and lower level agency
personnel;  staff training;  improved communications within each agency,
between agencies, and between agencies and users;  improved  information
retrieval, processing and sharing;  and developing means for establishing
accountability.  In general, since the number of users and agencies
involved in water management is  large, accountability arrangements are
difficult to  arrange.  Quality problems  further complicate matters,
particularly concerning information, as  does the highly variable water
supply.
Finally, in actually drafting new institutional approaches to deal
with water problems, we should try to answer the following questions
suggested by Wolf, 1979:
1.  Can desirable outcomes be obtained by making relatively easy changes
in the operation of existing markets?
2.  Can nonmarket policies be devised which retain useful market
characteristics, such as  competition?
3.  Can suitable measures for nonmarket output be devised which will then
be used to measure performance?
4.  Can agency standards and goals be changed to align agency behavior,
including personnel practices, more closely with the intended
output?
155.  Can improved information, feedback, and evaluation systems be built
into new policies, programs and operating rules, so that  the risks of
co-optation by a  'client'  group is  reduced?  (Wolf, 1979, pp.  136-
137).
Inaction
Problems  of nonmarket failure suggests that  the Chinese Taoist
(Daoist) philosopher Laozi may have been right when he counselled kings
that the best way to  rule was often to not intervene  in the natural course
of events.  Where conflict resolution mechanisms exist  in society,
government involvement may be redundant or even an impediment.  For
example, if there  is  a possibility of a subsidized, supply-oriented
government solution to a local conflict over water use, water users are
less likely to work out an accommodation among themselves which would
require them to reduce  their water use;  and they are less likely to build
projects on their own.  If government resources  for support are limited,
as  they usually are, water users (including local and state governments)
will often prefer to wait their turn or devote their resources  to lobbying
efforts.
The Corps  of Engineers used the nonintervention approach in the
summer of 1988 when they responded to the Governor of Minnesota's  request
to  increase the  flow of water into the Mississippi from two northern
Minnesota lakes.  They studied the problem until it  rained, and then
concluded that no action was necessary.
16Administrative Pricing
There are also opportunities in government to improve water use and
conservation through improved administrative pricing.  This  is
particularly true for municipal water supplies or waste disposal services,
where  there is  a good opportunity for pricing by volume used.  In many
Minnesota cities, each house has its  own water meter.  For many Minnesota
cities,  the problem is not lack of meters, but the lack of imagination by
municipal  leaders and those managing the facilities.  To  illustrate, only
24 percent of the Minnesota cities used a flat rate  (same charge no matter
how much water used) for water services,  while 46 percent charged flat
rates  for sewer services  (Easter et al.,  1988).  Many times the water
price or charge  is  set so that the cost of operation and maintenance  are
covered by revenues, but this does not usually  include a replacement
charge for facilities.  Water pricing is  seldom used to encourage
conservation or to reallocate time of use to non-peak periods.  At best,
you find a constant water rate where the  same price is  charged for each
unit of water used.  At worst, you find a fixed charge for water, no
matter how much is  consumed, or a declining rate where a lower price  is
charged for each additional unit of water  (i.e.,  1000 gal.).  Although
the number of Minnesota cities using the declining block rate has
decreased significantly, it was  still used by 32 percent of the cities  in
1985-86.  Less than one percent of Minnesota municipalities use an
increasing block rate, where the price per unit goes up for each
additional unit of water purchased during a given time period (Easter, et
al.,  1988).  They also do not use higher prices  during peak periods  to
discourage water use in the summer months or other peak periods.
17Part of the problem is  lack of information.  We do not know how
people will react to higher water prices.  For some uses, we would expect
that the price elasticity would be quite  low, while for others it may be
fairly high.  If we are dealing with domestic uses that are price
inelastic,  then water prices will have limited impact on use and will not
be a good means to encourage  conservation.  In such cases of inelastic
demand, water prices or charges  should be used mostly as a means  to
generate revenue.  However, during the summer period, consumers appear  to
be fairly responsive to  calls  to conserve water, which suggests  an elastic
demand.  Thus, high prices during such peak periods would encourage
conservation in water use.
Another reason why water or sewer charges are not used to  encourage
conservation is political.  Many local users  consider water and sewer
charges  as just another tax instead of a price for a good or service.
They complain about increasing water charges even when they are provided
better  service, particularly  if they are  large consumers.  Many city
administrators are also afraid that high water and sewer rates may
discourage industrial development.  Yet it does not appear that the level
of water and sewer rates  is  an important location criteria for most
industries.
As more and more cities are  faced with water shortages and
increasing costs of new water supplies,  these administrators will have to
begin to  look at water charges as a means to allocate water.  They have
begun to realize  that water has many of the characteristics of private
goods, i.e.,  in consumptive uses,  it  is  an exclusive and rival  good
(Randall, 1987).  People  can be excluded from using certain water supplies
18and consumption by one  group reduces the quantity available  for others.
Higher water charges will also  facilitate water transfers from other
sectors for, at  least, two reasons.  First, higher water charges will
probably generate more revenue, which means municipalities will have more
funds  to purchase added water supplies or improve the efficiency with
which they deliver current supplies.  Second, higher charges will indicate
a high willingness to pay, which then can be used to show how much more
valuable water  is when it  is used for municipal consumption rather than to
grow corn or other agricultural crops.
Great Lakes Charter
A new institutional arrangement which has been developed to help  in
managing Great Lakes water withdrawals is  the Great Lakes Charter.  In
1985,  the eight Great Lake States governors  and two Premiers agreed in
principle  to coordinate water quantity management in the Great Lakes by
signing the Great Lakes  Charter.  By 1990, five of the state legislature
and the two Great Lakes provinces had enacted legislation that gave the
Charter the force of law.  The Charter requires  states or provinces to
give prior notice and consultation to all affected states and provinces
prior to approving any major new water diversion or consumptive use of
Great Lakes water.  It also  involves  the development of a common data base
for the Great Lakes and the creation of a Water Resources Management
Committee to develop a Great Lakes water management program.
The Charter creates a cooperative forum to  regulate aggregate water
use  in the Great Lakes.  The primary instrument that is being used for
regulation is non-tradeable water permits  (Frerichs and Easter, 1990).
19Whether the Charter will be successful when significant water
shortage occurs  is not clear.  Three  states have still not fully adopted
the Charter.  In addition, there is no clear method for reducing
withdrawals allowed under the permits during periods  of water shortages.
It  is best suited for slowing down the granting of permits  for large
increases in water use, either within the basin or  through water
transfers  to  areas outside  the basin.
Collective Action by Users
Collective action by local water users  is nothing new.  As
Swaminathan  (1986, p. v.)  so  aptly states:
People dependent upon renewable natural resources have
evolved ways of managing them properly.  When they have failed
to do so,  the people, the resources,  or both have disappeared.
Communities have developed such  institutionalized forms  of
control  as irrigation councils  in southern Asia, forest-cutting
controls  in Nepal, wildlife utilization taboos  and regulations
in the Congo Basin, the hema system of pasture protection in
Arabia, fishermen's  indigenous associations  in western and
southern Asia, and land use management for conservation in
Zimbabwe.
Although excellent examples of collective natural resource management
can be  found in Minnesota and other U.S. states, they are difficult to
create.  What can be done to help establish effective decentralized water
management?
Collective action and cost-sharing
Many water conflicts can best be dealt with within the watershed in
which they occur by first understanding the distributional effects.
People in the upper part of the watershed do not receive  the downstream
benefits from their soil or water conservation efforts (Easter et al.,
201986,  Ch.  11).  They, therefore, do not devote adequate attention to  soil
or water protection activities in terms of the benefits and costs  to
society.  A number of approaches have been tried to  overcome this problem,
including subsidies.  In Japan, before 1920  "irrigation associations and
municipalities downstream were very active in improving the deteriorated
watersheds  at their own expense....  The most common measures  taken by the
water users downstream were the acquisition of critical watersheds  and
profit sharing plantations on alien lands"  (Kumazaki, 1982, p. 113).
Later on, municipalities  and power companies shared the costs  of upland
plantation projects.  As water use increased, however, higher levels of
government took over more responsibility and "leased the privately owned
watersheds and planted tree(s),  with financial cooperation of the water
users downstream, who in turn enjoyed a certain share of the revenues from
the plantations"  (Kumazaki, 1982, p. 116).
Thus collective action and cost-sharing by all beneficiaries of
clean-up efforts can be an important way of improving water quality and
quantity.  The  level of an area's economic and institutional development
and the degree of pressure on the resource appear to play major roles  in
determining the organizational and institutional forms adopted.  Formal
and informal private and collective actions can be a primary impetus for
water quality improvement.  In other cases, government agencies will have
to play a larger role  in protecting water resources, particularly if a
large number of polluters are  involved or the polluters have substantial
economic or political power.
One of the key components of such collective action is  a good
understanding by downstream water users of the benefits  they receive  from
21conservation activities upstream.  Given this knowledge,  institutional
arrangements need to be in place that allow them to assist  in conservation
activities.  If they are cost-sharing, they need to know that the  funds
will be used for  the desired purposes.  When they want to have more direct
control,  they need to have the option to  lease or purchase easements in
the upper watershed.
Cost-sharing by downstream interests would be considered fair by
upstream land owners, since  the downstream users  get most of the
benefits.  These activities may even encourage upstream land owners  to
engage  in more conservation practices because of the principle of
reciprocity  (Sugden, 1984).  Since downstream users are installing and
cost-sharing on conservation practices, the upstream owners may feel they
should also contribute.
Assurance and Free Riders
One  of the first  steps in establishing decentralized water management
is  to  recognize the complexity of the task involved.  Institutional and
organizational changes  are needed at three different levels:  (1) the
approach must be accepted as legitimate at the state and national levels,
(2) government agencies must be willing to establish close working
relationships with water users and with each other, and (3) the water
users must be willing to organize to manage their water resources.
Obstacles are found at all three levels.  Vested interested may block
needed legislative action at the national or state level.  Agencies may
not be willing to  decentralize decision making and share control  over
water resources.  Water users may lack the commitment and willingness to
22take over new and sometimes risky responsibilities.  The risk comes from
two sources.  First,  it comes from the need to resolve actual and
potential conflicts among water users.  Second, it involves uncertainty
concerning whether or not the government agency or agencies will, in fact,
work with local water users and involve them in management  decisions.
Agency commitments to decentralized water management can change as quickly
as  administrative personnel are changed, especially when appropriate
rights and incentives have not been established.
If assurance can be provided that the federal and state governments
will indeed implement decentralized water management, conditions still
have to be right at the local level.  A key to decentralizing water
management is broad based local participation, both to  ensure consensus
among water users and to build important links between the local community
and government officials.  Constructive participation does not just
happen.  Local communities and their members must receive significant
benefits  from participation.  In addition, gains  to  individuals need to be
consistent with those  for the community as a whole, and the problem of
"free riding" must be overcome.
The free rider is a classic problem where individuals who cannot be
denied access to a resource or collective good do not contribute to  its
provision or maintenance  (Olson, 1971).  If enough users are  free riders,
the resource will no longer be available or  its quality will be low or  its
management will have to be subsidized by the larger  tax paying public.
Experiments and empirical observations, however, have shown that
people have a higher inclination to  cooperate  than indicated by the  theory
of the free rider  (Etzioni, 1988,  Ch. 4).  Some have attributed this
23comforting evidence to shared values and the moral foundations of
society.4 Cultural,  ethnic and political factors are clearly important.
Others, such as Runge  (1984) and Williamson  (1985),  have considered the
role of institutional design as well.  Runge found the key to cooperative
behavior among fishermen to be the development of institutions  that
provide assurance that others will limit their fishing effort if you do
the same.
A number of factors  seem to make it easier  to  develop and implement
institutions that provide the necessary assurance for collective action.
These  include situations where:  (1) communities are relatively small,
stable, and homogenous, (2) community leadership  is strong and
representative,  (3)  benefits from cooperation are high and relatively
evenly distributed and (4) the community has had experience in providing
collective goods  and has received benefits from doing so  (Easter, 1986 and
Easter and Palanisami, 1986).
Fairness and Reciprocity
Several authors have argued that there are  other important factors
determining whether or not institutional arrangements will result in
effective collective action  (Baumol, 1982, and Sugden, 1984).  The first
4.  "We believe  it  is  important to recognize the forces of ethics,
etiquette, and 'proper, correct, reasonable, moral, etc.'  standards of
conduct  in controlling business relationships....People do not always
violate contracts whenever their own costs are less  than their own gains
from violation.  Temptations of free-riding or stealing are  resisted even
when the net gains for free-riding or stealing are great.  We don't know
enough about how much  'moral' forces  operate to  say more than that they
exist and should not be ignored in seeking an understanding of
how....economic institutions....evolve and operate"  (Alchian and Woodward,
1988,  p. 77).
24of these is  fairness.  According  to Baumol (1982, p. 640),  "A distribution
is  fair if it involves no envy by any individual of any other."  An
institutional arrangement would be judged to be fairer if it reduced envy.
Thus an institution which fosters collective action that provides uniform
benefits across  all users would probably be considered fair.
Sugden (1984) takes a slightly different approach to explain the
collective or voluntary provision of goods and services.  According to
him, the principle of reciprocity, critical  in explaining the provision of
collective or public goods,  is that  "each person tends  to contribute more
as others contribute more"  (Sugden, 1984, p. 783).
Thus the  factors listed above as providing assurance may also enhance
reciprocity.  One difference  is that Sugden argues  that the principle
suggests that those with the strongest preference for the collective good
relative to effort will tend to make  the largest contributions.  Richer
individuals will, therefore, contribute more than poorer ones, because
they want to, not simply because of their greater ability to pay.
While  Sugden's allowance  for income and power differentials make
reciprocity more appealing as a basis  for collective action in water
management than assurance, it does not fully solve the free rider problem
in the absence  of proper assurances  (Sugden, 1984, p. 781).  Nor does  it
adequately address  the problem of rent seeking either in collective action
or direct government management.
CONCLUSION
This work is  still at  the exploratory stage of investigating
alternative approaches to resolving water conflicts in Minnesota and how
25institutional arrangements can be designed to better resolve them.  Every
approach has  its  strengths and its weaknesses.  The trend is  toward
greater user involvement, and towards making government agencies more
responsive to users,  either through changing the way they do business or
through  "privatization" of their functions.  Two  factors  are likely to
lead to increases  in the number and type of conflicts  involving water:
(1) the growing complexity of the structure of water demands, which has
grown to  include recreation and tourism and certain "rights of nature";
and (2) the profusion of environmental hazards, many of them caused by
technical change, improvements in living standards and economic growth,
and most of which are dimly understood and inadequately measured.  Thus
resilience is  likely to be the most important characteristic determining
the effectiveness of institutional arrangements  in the coming years.  This
includes  the ability of the institutions themselves to adapt to new
circumstances.
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